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INTRODUCTION
The high level of financial integration through banking
groups in the CEE region has a number of advantages, but
poses several risks as well. The presence of west European
banks improves the efficiency of the region’s banking systems
in several ways: it provides more opportunities to obtain
funds and reduces their costs; non-resident financial investors
establish their own high quality risk management and
technology in their foreign establishments, and non-resident
capital inflow boosts competition in local markets. Besides
the great number of advantages, a strong presence of non-
resident investors also implies a higher risk that problems
originating in foreign interbank markets may spread to the
region. 
The aim of this article is to describe the interrelationships
between banking markets of CEE and other countries arising
from the ownership linkages, and to assess the degree and
direction of the contagion risk stemming from these
interrelationships. In relation to contagion channels, we
examine both directions. One possible scenario is that a
problem affecting a parent bank jeopardises its subsidiary;
another where a subsidiary bank may pose a significant
problem for the operation of its parent bank. These scenarios
may form a threat to the stability of individual countries if the
‘infected’ bank has an important weight in the market of its
country, and therefore its failure may trigger turmoil in the
financial markets of that country and create a considerable
financial burden for actors of the real economy. 
Of the sources of contagion risk within a banking group, we
assessed those stemming from ownership linkages.
Nevertheless, group level contagion may not solely be
transmitted via ownership relations. Group level
interconnectedness may be the result of group level or
centralised market and liquidity risk management and the
ensuing exposure, the transfer of certain internal decision-
making competences to the level of the parent bank, or
simply the risk of reputation contagion within the banking
group. This study does not undertake to assess these risks.
We can measure contagion risk on the basis of two factors: a)
the likelihood of contagion among individual members of
banking groups; and b) the significance of potentially
infected members in their own markets. Our analysis used
data of the leading 24 banking groups in the region.
1 The
probability of contagion within a banking group depends on
the group structure, i.e. the size of individual members
relative to the other banks within the group. In order to
approximate the group level weight of subsidiaries, we
examined the proportion of the relevant subsidiary’s balance
sheet total relative to the consolidated balance sheet total of
the banking group. In addition, we estimated the degree of
turbulence a credit institution may generate in a specific
country by means of its market share based on its balance
sheet total. It should be noted that this implies a considerable
degree of simplification. A credit institution may in fact have
such an important role in a financial market or the operation
of financial infrastructures that its failure may generate a
significant shock in the banking sector of a specific country
independently of the size of its balance sheet total.
We need to stress that this study does not set out to define a
threshold value over which a member of a banking group
could generate shocks within the banking group and in the
financial market of its own country. For the purpose of our
analysis, we assumed 5 and 10 per cent limits for the
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Due to a high ratio of foreign ownership, countries in the Central and East European (CEE) region are characterised by
particularly high financial integration. Therefore, contagion risks are high in both directions: a problem that develops in the
country of a parent bank can easily spread to the countries of its subsidiaries; and likewise, a problem that evolves in the
CEE region can spill over to the banking sector of the parent bank. In view of the significance of contagion risks, adequate
capital and liquidity allocation within banking groups is crucial; in other words, continuous and safe operations must be
ensured at all times for each member of the group. As their prudential and crisis management frameworks are rooted in a
fundamentally national context, financial authorities have to deal with several challenges.
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1 (Based on balance sheet totals) the bank groups in our sample cover 72-98 per cent of the total market share of non-resident subsidiaries in specific CEE countries. In
some cases statements for 2007 were not available, in which case we used data from the end of 2006.significance of a group member, both in its own market and
within the banking group. These hypothetical limit values are
mere indications. We definitely do not intend to imply that a
credit institution with a market share below 5 per cent as per
its balance sheet total is unable to generate market
turbulence. This is especially true in view of the
simplification noted above; market share measured on the
basis of balance sheet total does not give an indication of the
role of the specific credit institution in financial markets and
in the financial infrastructure. Moreover, even a group
member with a share of less than 5 per cent relative to the
consolidated balance sheet total of the group may generate
group-level shocks. 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE
BANKING MARKETS OF CEE COUNTRIES
The degree of financial integration in the banking markets of
CEE countries is extremely high. At the end of 2007 the
consolidated market share
2 of credit institutions with a non-
resident parent bank amounted to 57-96 per cent in
individual CEE countries (Chart 1).
3 Most of the credit
institutions with cross-border activities in the region are from
EU countries. The subsidiary company form of operation is
predominant across all member countries. However, a new
trend has emerged in recent years in CEE countries – the
presence of a growing number of branch offices. They have
typically smaller balance sheet totals and they serve key
customers or a certain target segment (so-called ‘wholesale’
and ‘niche’ banks).
4
Similar reasons account for the magnitude of foreign
presence – most of the non-resident banks operating in the
region obtained a share of the market during the privatisation
process at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the
2000s. In most countries in the region, foreign capital inflow
was allowed after the bank consolidation process, which
prepared members of the banking sector for privatisation,
and markets for the appearance of foreign banks. Bank
consolidation rid credit institution portfolios of bad and
doubtful debt and stabilised the financial and capital position
of credit institutions. Recent years have not seen any
additional, significant growth in market share, except for
Romania. 
The main driving force behind expansion to CEE countries
was the high growth potential of the target countries’
banking markets and the high profit margins compared to the
home markets. The high growth potential is based on real
economic and financial convergence of CEE countries to the
more advanced EU Member States. Banks entered a less
flooded market where they could instantly enjoy a number of
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2 For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘market share’refers to ratios calculated from balance sheet totals. 
3 It should be noted that Chart 1 includes banks owned by a non-resident credit institution only; due to listed credit institutions and indirect foreign ownership, the
actual foreign capital invested may in fact be considerably larger than indicated. 
4 Branch transformations in Hungary may be boosted by a recent legislation modification, which enables credit institutions with a registered seat in any EU Member
State to merge their interests within the EU. At the same time, we do not expect large retail banks to turn into branches, as, in addition to a number of other
advantages, relatively costly branch transformations are primarily motivated by capital optimisation aspects (e.g. large exposure limit).
Chart 1
Market share of foreign subsidiaries and branch
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Chart 2
Profitability of CEE banking markets and the home


































































































































Source: European Central Bank.comparative advantages (e.g. higher quality services and
product selection, better risk management tools). The
outstanding profitability potential is illustrated by the fact
that on average CEE banks achieved almost 23 per cent
return on equity in 2007, which drastically surpasses the 15
per cent average ROE achievable in the home markets of
parent companies (Chart 2).
In the recent years, financial integration through banking
markets has started within the region as well. Certain CEE
countries have some major domestic banks which are not
owned by a foreign parent company. The most prominent
examples include PKO Bank, the second largest bank in the
Polish market, and OTP, the largest Hungarian bank.
5 Both
are credit institutions listed directly on the stock exchange,
which means that there are no foreign bank investors behind
them. These banks have started to extend their operations to
other countries within the region. OTP has the most
outstanding cross-border activity; its Bulgarian subsidiary
(DSK) is the second largest bank in Bulgaria. 
Parent banks play a key role in the liquidity management of
their subsidiaries. The share of foreign borrowings within the
liability structure of credit institutions in the CEE region is
rather significant, amounting to 10-30 per cent of external
liabilities
6 (Chart 3). A large part of foreign loans are direct
parent bank loans (in Hungary their ratio is 64 per cent). This
is due to the fact that parent banks can obtain financing at
better terms and conditions due to their size; therefore
borrowing is often centralised in banking groups. In addition,
owners may have a significant role in organising financing
from money markets. 
ANALYSIS OF THE PARENT BANK –
SUBSIDIARY CONTAGION CHANNEL 
Contagion within a banking group, i.e. the spillover of a
problem to another member of the banking group and thus
to the banking market of another country may be
characterised by a two-way direction. Even though
subsidiaries are legal entities separate from their parent
company, due to their dependence on parent banks in terms
of certain functions, it is not clear whether a subsidiary can
pursue its activities independently in the event of the parent
bank’s failure (without public intervention or a
merger/acquisition). However, not only a parent bank’s
failure could be transmitted to its subsidiaries, a larger
subsidiary can also infect the parent company, via either
direct exposures or through a crisis of confidence spreading
to the entire banking group.
7
Looking at the contagion channel between the parent bank
and the subsidiary bank, there are several parent banks in the
region whose subsidiaries have a substantial weight in the
financial system of a CEE country. Table 1 shows which
parent banks have subsidiaries in a country within the region
with a share of around 5-10 per cent (marked in blue) or over
10 per cent (marked in claret). On this basis, we can estimate
the probability of whether a problem affecting a foreign
parent bank spilling over to its subsidiary could generate
turbulence in another country’s financial sector. Thus, for
instance, a potential problem affecting the Austrian Erste
Bank may spread to other banking markets through its Czech,
Slovak or Romanian subsidiaries. The large number of
coloured cells in Table 1 suggests that an idiosyncratic parent
bank problem might affect several subsidiaries with a
significant market share.
If we look at the cross-border activity of all the banks of a given
country rather than individual banking groups, we find that the
interconnectedness of the banking markets of different
countries is even higher (Chart 4). Since a general problem is
more likely to develop in banks located in the same country, it
is important to test the strength of the connection between the
banking systems of two countries in order to assess the
probability of cross-border contagion. (To mention one
example: the Romanian subsidiaries of Greek banks have a
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
MNB BULLETIN • DECEMBER 2008 8
Chart 3
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5 In addition, there are a few major listed banks or banks owned by the central government in the Bulgarian and Romanian markets. Of the Bulgarian banks, number 6,
8 and 10 are listed on the stock exchange, while number 4 of the Romanian banks is listed and number 9 is state-owned.
6 External liabilities are liabilities without capital and reserves.
7 In this respect we exclude branches, as a branch office is the same legal entity as its founder. market share of less than 10 per cent each, while their
aggregated share is 14 per cent. This implies that a problem in
the Greek banking market could also have a significant impact
on the Romanian market). In this context, the significance of
Austrian and Italian credit institutions is very high, as they have
subsidiaries with a market share of over 10 per cent in most
countries in the region; thus their potential shock may indeed
trigger a wave of contagion across the region.
At the same time, one-way dependence is not a characteristic
of any of these countries, as the financial investors in each
CEE country represent several countries (Chart 4). This is a
positive factor for the financial stability of countries in the
region, as diversification mitigates the risk of cross-border
shocks threatening financial stability. In other words, in this
case there is less dependence on the financial markets of
foreign countries than if most major investors were from the
same country. We should note at this point that certain
factors might undermine the importance of diversification.
On the one hand, the large banks of EU member states have
significant exposure to each other, which may create a
contagion channel among them as well. On the other hand –
as is the case with the recent subprime mortgage market
crisis – global problems may occur, which simultaneously
generate liquidity and/or solvency problems in multiple
countries. 
ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSIDIARY-PARENT
BANK CONTAGION CHANNEL 
The extent to which a shock affecting a subsidiary could
generate turbulence in the home banking market of the
parent bank depends on two factors: a) the significance of the
subsidiary within the banking group, and b) the significance
of the parent bank in its home banking market. Contagion via
the subsidiary-parent bank contagion channel will be less
likely if the subsidiary bank is of relatively minor significance
in the consolidated balance sheet total of the banking group.
On the other hand, the market share of the parent company
is indicative of the extent to which a failure of the parent
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Source: BankScope, disclosed annual reports
Note: The table includes only parent banks from the sample which have a market share of over 5 per cent in at least one CEE country. Cells highlighted
in blue indicate subsidiaries with a 5-10 per cent market share, while cells highlighted in claret indicate those with over 10 per cent market share. 
Parent company /subsidiary country Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia Romania Bulgaria CEE region
Erste Bank (AT) 18% 7% 0% 18% 25% 0% 9%
Raiffeisen (AT) 3% 8% 3% 15% 7% 10% 5%
Volksbank (AT) 1% 1% 0% 2% 5% 0% 1%
KBC (BE) 21% 9% 3% 8% 0% 0% 8%
Commerzbank (DE) 0% 1% 7% 0% 0% 0% 3%
Bayerische LB (DE) 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Societe Generale (FR) 14% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 5%
Alpha Bank (GR) 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 1%
EFG Eurobank (GR) 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 7% 1%
National Bank of Greece (GR) 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 10% 1%
OTP (HU) 0% 0% 3% 1% 13% 1%
Intesa (IT) 0% 8% 0% 17% 1% 0% 3%
Unicredit (IT) 7% 6% 14% 8% 4% 15% 10%
ING (NL) 0% 2% 6% 0% 0% 0% 3%
Table 1
Market share of subsidiaries in the region
Chart 4
Market share of Central and East European
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Source: BankScope, disclosed annual reports.bank could generate potential turbulence in the home
country or for the real economy actors it serves.
As the weight of subsidiaries in the region is typically
extremely low within the banking groups, there are few
subsidiaries in a situation where an idiosyncratic problem
could threaten the operation of the parent banks. In our
sample, there were only three subsidiaries within the region
whose contribution to the consolidated balance sheet total of
their own banking groups exceeded 10 per cent. If we fixed
the threshold at 5 per cent, we would find nine such banks,
which represents 16 per cent of our sample consisting of 56
banks. This suggests that the idiosyncratic problem of a
subsidiary could seldom jeopardise the operation of the
parent bank significantly. This is partly related to the fact that
parent banks functioning in the region usually operate in
much larger banking markets at home. For example, while
the consolidated total assets of the Polish banking market –
the largest in the region – were EUR 240 billion at the end of
2007, the volume of the German or the French market
exceeded EUR 7000 billion.
Due to the small scale of subsidiaries, a parent bank’s
willingness to help is not clear, which, in case of a subsidiary
with significant market share, could pose an additional risk
for the financial stability of its country. Of the subsidiaries in
the region, there are several examples where a subsidiary has
considerable market significance, which may even exceed 10
per cent, while its weight within the banking group does not
even reach 5 per cent (points circled in red on Chart 5).
Unless their liquidity status or capital position is stretched to
the extreme, parent banks will most probably stand behind
these subsidiaries if required. Since this would involve a
relatively small fund allocation for their size, it is highly
unlikely that the parent banks would be restricted by liquidity
or capital limitations. Under extreme circumstances,
however, they might decide to deny their subsidiary the
required funds, if they are convinced that ‘letting go’ of their
subsidiary would only have a minor impact on the operation
of the banking group as a whole. 
However, when we examine the region as a whole, we find
that some parent banks do in fact have combined exposures
which could jeopardise their operations if a shock affecting
the entire region occurred. Due to the relatively high level of
interconnectedness between the countries of the region, the
probability of a regional level shock is higher (e.g. global
liquidity tightening, regional level capital withdrawal/
exchange rate deterioration); therefore we also need to
examine the region’s banking markets and parent bank
exposures to the region collectively. If the parent banks have
interests in several countries within the region, their
combined interests can represent such exposure which in the
event of a regional problem may jeopardise the operations of
the parent bank. Looking at aggregate presence in the region,
there are five banking groups with significant presence for
which the consolidated balance sheet total of their members
operating in the CEE region represents at least 10 per cent of
their consolidated balance sheet total (Erste, Raiffeisen,
Volksbank, OTP, KBC). Of all five banking groups, the OTP
group is in the exceptional position of having the parent bank
itself located in the region. If we lower the limit to 5 per cent,
an additional five banks can be included in the list (Table 2).
Therefore, looking at the region as a whole, we find that
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 5
Market shares of individual subsidiaries and their
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Chart 6
Significance of parent banks in their home banking
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Sources: BankScope, disclosed annual reports of individual banks and
banking groups.individual parent banks do in fact have combined exposures
which could jeopardise their operations in the event of a
regional level shock. 
Since parent banks with significant exposures in the region
are key participants in their own markets as well, contagion
via banking groups may be two-way. According to Chart 6,
four of the five parent banks which are highly active in the
region (and whose subsidiaries contribute to the consolidated
balance sheet total by over 10 per cent) have a market share
of over 5 per cent (banks circles in red) in their home country
as well. All those parent banks whose subsidiaries contribute
to the consolidated balance sheet total by 5-10 per cent have
a market share of over 5 per cent in their home market.
Therefore, we can conclude that parent banks – which are
susceptible to contagion in the event of a regional level
problem – may transmit their problems to their home
financial markets. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Due to a high ratio of foreign ownership, countries in the
Central and East European region are characterised by
particularly high financial integration. Therefore, the risk of
contagion is high in both directions: a problem affecting the
country of a parent bank can easily spread to the countries of
its subsidiaries; and likewise, a problem affecting the CEE
region can spread to the home market of the parent bank. The
probability and severity of contagion largely depend on the
level at which the problem occurs – whether it is idiosyncratic,
country-specific, regional level or a global shock. 
Parent bank-subsidiary bank contagion risks are extremely
high in all CEE countries. Since there are several banking
groups (e.g. Erste, Unicredit) whose subsidiaries have a
market share of over 10 per cent, even an idiosyncratic
problem at the parent might cause grave problems in the
countries of the subsidiaries. If the countries of the parent
banks suffer a general shock, the implications may be even
graver. Looking at the contagion channel between the
subsidiary bank and the parent bank, we find that, even
though an idiosyncratic subsidiary-level problem is less likely
to cause turbulence in the home market of the parent bank, a
regional level problem may affect many home countries (e.g.
Austria).
In view of the potential magnitude of contagion, adequate
capital and liquidity allocation within the banking group is
crucial; in other words, continuous and safe operations must
be ensured at all times for each member of the group. This
represents an extremely big challenge in the current
vulnerable environment, when individual authorities are
striving to take measures primarily with the aim of
strengthening the financial stability of their own countries,
and in certain circumstances even restricting the cross-border
reallocation of funds. 
The growing level of financial integration poses challenges
for all types of financial authorities:
• Supervisors. On the one hand, since different supervisory
authorities are responsible for the supervision of
subsidiaries and parent banks, the assessment of the
CHALLENGES OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN...
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Note: The table does not include data of foreign branches. The table includes only those banking groups whose subsidiaries in the region in aggregate
contributed to the consolidated balance sheet total in excess of 5 per cent. Cells highlighted in blue indicate subsidiaries with a 5-10 per cent share, while
cells highlighted in claret indicate those with over 10 per cent share. 
Sources: BankScope, disclosed annual reports.
Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia Romania Bulgaria CEE region
Erste Bank 12% 4% 0% 5% 9% 0% 30%
Raiffeisen 3% 6% 4% 5% 4% 2% 25%
Volksbank 2% 2% 0% 1% 5% 0% 10%
KBC 10% 3% 2% 1% 0% 0% 16%
Alpha Bank 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% 7%
EFG Eurobank 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 3% 9%
National Bank of Greece 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 6%
OTP 0% 60% 0% 4% 3% 12% 80%
Unicredit 1% 1% 3% 0% 0% 0% 6%
Millenium BCP 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 0% 9%
Table 2
Weight of CEE subsidiaries within individual banking groupsfinancial health and risk exposure of the entire banking
group is an increasingly difficult task for the consolidating
supervisor. On the other, as the exposures of a subsidiary
are increasingly hard to assess at the individual level, it is
also essential for the authorities supervising the subsidiaries
to have access to banking group level information.
Therefore, improving transparency and ensuring two-way
information exchange between supervisory authorities is a
key priority. A long-term solution could be the
establishment of an EU-level or lead supervisory authority,
which would be responsible for the supervision of large
banking groups with significant cross-border activities.
However, when developing possible solutions, it is vital
that the centralisation of supervisory activities should not
endanger an appropriate information base being available
for the financial authorities of all those countries where the
banking group has a significant presence, nor their being
timely alerted in an emergency situation.
• Central banks. It is also important for central banks to
harmonise their terms and conditions for liquidity
provision (e.g. the set of eligible collateral) and ensure that
individual members of banking groups can obtain central
bank liquidity under the same terms and conditions in
different countries. The situation is further complicated in
the CEE region because even though the countries in our
sample are not members of the euro area, there is
significant demand for euro liquidity in order to finance
foreign currency denominated loans. In the provision of
these funds, subsidiaries substantially rely on their parent
banks. 
• Ministries of Finance. Due to a lack of EU-level
supranational funds, the burden-sharing of a government
bailout of banking groups with substantial cross-border
activity is a great challenge, as bailing out the entire
banking group would be too great a burden for one country
alone to bear. The ongoing turmoil has drawn attention to
the fact that government intervention may distort the level
playing field. In order to prevent this, coordinated EU-level
intervention is required, instead of unique, piecemeal,
country-level solutions.
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